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Abstract
The choice between quantity and price in order to stabilize collusion is modeled
here. It is shown that this relocates the prisoners’ dilemma backwards, from the
market stage to the stage where the market variable is chosen in order to sustain
collusion, and where discount rates appear as the payo¤s. Likewise, a prisoners’
dilemma arises also when both the market variable and the type of behavior
(cooperative or non-cooperative) are simultaneously chosen.
JEL classi…cation: C72, D43, L13.
Keywords: meta-game, supergame, prisoners’ dilemma.
List of symbols: ®; b®; °; pi; qi; !; b!; ¼i; b¼i; ¦:
1 Introduction
The question how …rms should play an oligopoly game has received a good deal of
attention in the recent literature. On the one hand, when non-cooperative pro…t
maximization is considered, one may ask whether …rms prefer to set prices or
quantities, and whether they move simultaneously or sequentially. On the other
hand, if attention is turned to collusive pro…t maximization, is cartel behavior
more likely to be sustained by price- or quantity-setting …rms? The …rst two
questions, concerned with one-shot oligopoly games, have been tackled by Singh
and Vives [16] and Hamilton and Slutsky [8], respectively. On the basis of the
former contribution, we may expect …rms to set quantities rather than prices
when goods are substitutes, and vice versa when goods are complements.1 From
the latter paper, it emerges that a simultaneous equilibrium will be observed only
if …rms choose to …x outputs. Summing up, what we seemingly know so far as to
one-shot games is that they are likely to be played simultaneously in the quantity
(respectively, price) space if goods are substitutes (complements).2
Another direction followed by the existing literature on the Bertrand-Cournot
debate is that of capacity constraints, and their consequences on the shape of
market competition when duopolists set prices (Levitan and Shubik [11]; Kreps
and Scheinkman [9]; Osborne and Pitchik [14]; Davidson and Deneckere [4]). The
results obtained by this approach can be summarized as follows. When both …rms
have enough capacity to serve the whole market, the standard Bertrand outcome
obtains. Otherwise, with binding capacity constraints, the Cournot outcome
emerges, notwithstanding …rms’ price-setting behavior.
How about supergames? We examine several contributions dealing with the
problem of cartel stability in price or quantity supergames (Deneckere [5]; Ma-
jerus [12]; Rothschild [15]). The conclusions reached in these papers are rather
contradictory, and allow for the general consideration that cartel stability is highly
sensitive to both the functional form selected for market demand and the num-
ber of …rms. One of these contributions is of particular interest here, that of
Deneckere [5], who adopts a model which is a slightly simpli…ed version of Singh
and Vives’, and …nds that, along most of the substitutability range, a quantity-
setting cartel is more easily sustained than a price-setting cartel (the opposite
obviously holds when goods are complements). Hence, again it appears that
Cournot behavior should emerge as the most pro…table one. However, neither
1See Cheng [3] for a graphical description of Singh and Vives’ analysis. Vives [17] and
Okuguchi [13] deal with the relative e¢ciency of Bertrand and Cournot behavior.
2This can be easily ascertained evaluating the payo¤s yielded by simultaneous and sequential
moves in the two settings where …rms optimize in the same variable and in the mixed setting
where they optimize in di¤erent variables (Boyer and Moreaux [2]; Denicolò and Lambertini
[6]).
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Deneckere nor others take into account the possibility that …rms choose to collude
in heterogeneous variables. This amounts to saying that, while indeed quantity
behavior appears to minimize the probability of defection by either …rm from the
cartel agreement in a wide parameter range, the fact that this is also su¢cient to
ensure that …rms will actually collude in output levels is far from being obvious.
I shall analyse this issue by considering the choice of the strategic variable
as the outcome of …rm’s behavior, be that cooperative or non-cooperative, in a
framework where the usual repeated market game leads to a meta-game, which
is not necessarily observable, whose object is precisely the selection of the most
e¢cient way to play the market game. Alternatively, the model I am going to
present below can be interpreted as an extended game in two stages à la Hamilton
and Slutsky [8], where …rms …rst non-cooperatively declare their preferences over
the variable to be selected for the downstream market stage, given that in the
latter they aim at minimizing the probability that either of them defects from
a cooperative agreement conceived to maximize joint pro…ts. This will establish
that, while in the market game the prisoners’ dilemma concerns the choice of the
behavior (cooperative vs non-cooperative), given the variable(s) being set by the
…rms, in the meta-game where the …rms aim at minimizing the probability of
defection, the prisoners’ dilemma shows up as involving the choice of the market
variable (price vs quantity), given the cooperative attitude that …rms are assumed
to exhibit in the market game. Finally, I will show that a prisoners’ dilemma also
a¤ects the game where …rms choose at the same time between cooperating or not
and between Bertrand or Cournot competition.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 the basic
model is introduced. Then, section 3 deals with the usual prisoners’ dilemma
arising from market competition, while the prisoners’ dilemma a¤ecting the at-
tempt at stabilizing collusion is treated in section 4. The possibility for …rms to
choose both the variable and the type of behavior at the same time is dealt with
in section 5. Finally, section 6 provides concluding comments.
2 The basic model
The framework adopted here is a simpli…ed version of Singh and Vives’ [16].
Two …rms, labelled as i and j, o¤er a single product each. The marginal cost
of production is assumed to be constant and equal across …rms. For the sake of
simplicity, I normalize it to zero. The inverse demand function faced by …rm i
when both producers set output levels is
pi = 1¡ qi ¡ °qj; (1)
where j°j 2 [0; 1] denotes the degree of substitutability between the two products,
which are substitutes if ° 2]0; 1]; and complements if ° 2 [¡1; 0[: Given the
nature of the model, in the remainder of the paper I will restrict attention to the
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case of substitutes. The direct demand function faced by …rm i when both are
price-setters is
qi =
1
1 + °
¡ 1
1¡ °2 pi +
°
1¡ °2pj: (2)
When instead …rm i acts as a quantity-setter while …rm j is a price-setter, their
respective demand functions are
pi = 1¡ qi + °(pj + °qi ¡ 1); (3)
qj = 1¡ pj ¡ °qi: (4)
In the absence of production costs, each …rm’s pro…t function corresponds to
revenue, ¼i = piqi:
3 Prisoners’ dilemma in the market game
As is well known, duopoly games, whether in prices or in quantities, are a¤ected
by a prisoners’ dilemma, since for every …rm the non-cooperative strategy dom-
inates the cooperative one. The solution is provided by the folk theorem, which
I shall adopt here in the usual ”grim strategy” version (Friedman [7]), where
deviation in one period triggers a Nash punishment forever,3 as in Deneckere [5],
who obtained the following discount factors:
®qq =
(° + 2)2
°2 + 8° + 8
; ®pp =
(° ¡ 2)2
°2 ¡ 8° + 8; ° · 0:73; (5)
where superscript qq (respectively, pp) indicates that both …rms set quantities
(resp., prices). The constraint on ° is meant to guarantee the non-negativity
of quantities in all phases.4 Provided ®qq < ®pp; Cournot behavior appears to
ensure a greater stability of the cartel agreement than Bertrand behavior does.
The reason can be found in the greater incentive to deviate that characterizes a
cartel in prices.
I turn now to a brief description of the game where …rms optimize in het-
erogeneous variables. The demand functions are (3) and (4). Straightforward
computations yield the following Nash equilibrium pro…ts:
3Friedman’s retaliation scheme is not the only one we could use. Optimal punishment
schemes have been proposed in recent literature (see Abreu [1]; and Lambson [10]). I adopt
Friedman’s formulation for the sake of comparison with the contributions referenced to in the
text.
4If ° 2]0:73; 1]; i.e., goods are very close substitutes, the non-negativity constraint on quan-
tities yields a di¤erent expression for ®pp (see Deneckere [5, p. 41]). For the purposes of this
paper, (5) su¢ces.
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¼qNi =
(° ¡ 2)2(1¡ °2)
(3°2 ¡ 4)2 ; ¼
pN
j =
(° ¡ 1)2(° + 2)2
(3°2 ¡ 4)2 (6)
where …rm i is a quantity-setter, while …rm j is a price-setter. The maximization
of joint pro…ts requires qMi = 1=(2(1 + °)) and p
M
j = 1=2: This pair of strategies
yields cartel pro…ts ¦M = 1=(2(1 + °)): As to the pro…ts each …rm gains under
collusion, two possibilities arise. The …rst is that both …rms are entitled to half the
cartel pro…ts (which is indeed the amount each of them obtains by substituting
qMi and p
M
j = 1=2 into the individual pro…t functions), i.e., ¼
qM
i = ¼
pM
j = ¦
M=2;
the second consists in splitting evenly the additional pro…ts made available by
collusion, in the light of the asymmetry between non-cooperative pro…ts:
b¼qMi = ¼qNi + ¦M ¡ ¼qNi ¡ ¼pNj2 ; b¼pMj = ¼pNj + ¦
M ¡ ¼qNi ¡ ¼pNj
2
; (7)
where obviously
b¼qMi > ¼qMi ; b¼pMj < ¼pMj 8 ° 2 [0; 0:73]: (8)
As to the deviation phase, the individually optimal deviation output (price)
when the other …rm sticks to the collusive price (output) corresponds to qDi =
(2¡°)=(4(1¡°2)) and pDj = (2+°)=(4(1+°)), respectively, yielding the following
deviation pro…ts:
¼qDi =
(° ¡ 2)2
16(1¡ °2) ; ¼
pD
i =
(° + 2)2
16(1 + °2)
(9)
and the following pro…ts for the …rm being cheated:
¼pChj =
°2 + 2° ¡ 2
8(°2 ¡ 1) ; ¼
qCh
i =
2 + 2° ¡ °2
8(° + 1)2
(10)
Since ¼qDi > b¼qMi > ¼qMi > ¼qNi > ¼qChi , and ¼pDj > ¼pMj > b¼pMj > ¼pNj > ¼pChj
hold for the quantity-setter and the price-setter, respectively, the mixed situation
where …rms optimize in di¤erent variables reproduces the prisoners’ dilemma,
irrespectively of the rule adopted to split cartel pro…ts. The question arises
whether the quantity setter may be willing to give up part of the pro…ts she
would obtain under (7) to allow the price-setter to get half the monopoly pro…ts.
An answer will be provided at the end of section 4. As in the pure price or
quantity games, a Pareto-improvement on the non-cooperative outcome can be
reached in the repeated game over an in…nite horizon, if …rms i and j ’s discount
factors are at least as high as the critical thresholds, de…ned as:
®qp =
¼qDi ¡ ¼qMi
¼qDi ¡ ¼qNi
; ®pq =
¼pDj ¡ ¼pMj
¼pDj ¡ ¼pNj
; (11)
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where superscript qp (pq) indicates that the discount factor is computed for the
quantity-setter (price-setter), and ¼qMi = ¼
pM
i = ¦
M=2: Alternatively, if rule (7)
is adopted,
b®qp = ¼qDi ¡ b¼qMi
¼qDi ¡ ¼qNi
; b®pq = ¼pDj ¡ b¼pMj
¼pDj ¡ ¼pNj
: (12)
After some simple albeit tedious calculations, one …nds that the individual dis-
count factors must satisfy the following inequalities:
®i > ®
qp =
(3°2 ¡ 4)2
(° ¡ 2)2(8¡ 7°2) ; ®j > ®
pq =
(3°2 ¡ 4)2
(° + 2)2(8¡ 7°2) (13)
if cartel pro…ts are evenly split between the two …rms, or
®i > b®qp = 16¡ 16° ¡ 8°2 + 16°3 ¡ 7°4
(° ¡ 2)2(8¡ 7°2) ;
®j > b®pq = 16 + 16° ¡ 8°2 ¡ 16°3 ¡ 7°4
(° + 2)2(8¡ 7°2) (14)
if cartel pro…ts are split according to (7). These two pairs of critical discount
factors can coexist when ° · 0:73:
4 Prisoners’ dilemma in the upstream stage
The existing literature establishes that if …rms selling substitute goods can choose
between setting price or quantity, they end up with a Cournot-Nash outcome,
since setting the output is a strictly dominant strategy (Singh and Vives [16]).
They can seemingly proceed to an analogous choice in order to stabilize collusion
(or minimize the probability of defection from the cartel agreement). To this aim,
they must non-cooperatively choose to set prices or quantities so as to minimize
their respective critical discount factors. The mechanism can be imagined to work
as follows. In each period, …rms face two overlapping problems. The …rst is the
usual market competition, which I have analysed in the previous section. If …rms
want to improve on the non-cooperative outcome, they must be patient enough
to sustain collusion. The second consists in choosing the variable for the game,
provided they are indeed aiming at stabilizing the cooperative agreement over
time. The issue can also be approached by another route, by noting that, once
they collude, the variable in which they are cooperating is in fact unobservable,5
so that they may wonder (i) which kind of deviation is more pro…table; and (ii)
which kind of punishment is more severe, i.e., more likely to ensure stability.
5With the unique exception of the mixed case where they adopt rule (7).
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Summing up, from the repetition of the downstream stage in…nitely many
times, …rms obtain the critical discount factors pertaining to the symmetric mar-
ket games where both set prices or quantities, and the asymmetric games where
one sets the price and the other …xes the output level. Proceeding backwards,
…rms non-cooperatively choose the strategic variable in the upstream stage, whose
outcomes are de…ned in terms of the discount factors themselves.
The outcome of such a process, which follows purely from logical considera-
tions and is not necessarily observable, is summarized in the following
Proposition 1 Due to the prisoners’ dilemma which arises in the upstream
phase of the repeated game, …rms will choose to be price-setters instead of quantity-
setters, even though Cournot behavior would ensure a higher degree of stability to
the cartel agreement.
Proof. The normal form of the upstream stage of the game is described by
matrix 1.
j
p q
i p ®pp; ®pp ®pq or b®pq;®qp or b®qp
q ®qp or b®qp;®pq or b®pq ®qq; ®qq
Matrix 1
Provided that, for ° · 0:73;
®qp > b®qp > ®pp > ®qq > b®pq > ®pq; (15)
and the game yields a prisoners’ dilemma regardless of the rule adopted to split
cartel pro…ts, in that the pair (q; q) leads to an outcome that Pareto-dominates
the one associated with the pair (p; p), but players non-cooperatively select (p; p)
as the Nash equilibrium strategy pair, since p strictly dominates q.
Hence, when …rms aim at sustaining collusion over time, they end up selecting
the market variable which ensures an ine¢cient outcome. This highlights that the
approach adopted in previous works in this …eld, consisting in a straightforward
comparison between ®pp and ®qq, was largely misleading in that it didn’t take
into account any strategic consideration, namely, the fact that, given the other
…rm’s choice, a quantity-setter can always gain by turning into a price-setter. An
intuitive explanation of this phenomenon can be given in the following terms.
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Consider for instance the inequality ®qp > ®pp, where ®qp is obtained by evenly
splitting cartel pro…ts, so that the individual collusive pro…ts used to compute
the two discount factors are the same. It is known that ¼qNi is higher than the
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium pro…t (Singh and Vives [16]), and it can be easily
checked that the deviation pro…ts in the symmetric Bertrand setting are higher
than the corresponding deviation pro…ts in the mixed case where the cheating
…rm is a quantity-setter while the cheated one is a price-setter. The overall e¤ect
yielding the above inequality is due to the fact that the Nash threat prevails over
the incentive to defect, and discount factors turn out to be ordered the same as
the punishment payo¤s.
Moreover, recalling the conclusion reached by Singh and Vives [16] concerning
the non-cooperative choice of the variable in the one-shot market game, the above
analysis leads to the following corollary:
Corollary 1 When …rms non-cooperatively select the market variable in order to
stabilize collusion, they choose to act in the opposite strategy space as compared
to that they would non-cooperatively select to maximize single period pro…ts.
Since …rms are playing a repeated game on the market, where they are trying
to collude in a sustainable way, one can imagine that, in order to achieve the
Pareto-superior outcome associated with collusion in quantities, …rms must repeat
as well the interaction in the upstream stage in…nitely many times, building thus
a meta-repeated game whose payo¤s are the critical discount factors displayed in
matrix 1. The outcome is summarized in
Proposition 2 Firms can e¢ciently sustain collusion in quantities if their in-
dividual meta-discount factor is above the critical threshold(s) arising from the
repetition of the constituent meta-game in…nitely many times.
Proof. The collusive payo¤ corresponds to ®qq, the non-cooperative one to ®pp;
the deviation one to ®pq (or b®pq), while …nally the cheated …rm gets ®qp (orb®qp). The critical thresholds of the meta-discount factor associated with the
meta-repeated game are:
! =
®pq ¡ ®qq
®pq ¡ ®pp ; b! = b®
pq ¡ ®qqb®pq ¡ ®pp : (16)
For collusion to be sustainable in the meta-repeated game, the individual
meta-discount factors of players (which coincide in the meta-game) must satisfy
either the following inequality:
!i > ! =
2(1 + °)2(8¡ 8° + °2)(°3 + 6°2 ¡ 8)
(8 + 8° + °2)(2°5 ¡ 9°4 ¡ 2°3 + 24°2 ¡ 16) (17)
or the alternative
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!i > b! = 2(1 + °)2(8¡ 8° + °2)
(8 + 8° + °2)(6¡ 5°2) ; (18)
where ! 2 [1; 0:808] and b! 2 [1=3; 0:336]; provided that ° 2 [0:; 0:73]:
A last remark can be put forward. The di¤erence between ! and b! is decreas-
ing and strictly concave in °, for all ° 2 [0; 0:73]; so that it appears that rule (7)
yields higher stability, in that it yields a threshold which is considerably lower
than that obtained when cartel pro…ts are evenly distributed across …rms. Hence,
when …rms aim at stabilizing collusion over time, they are better o¤ resorting to
rule (7), if a side payment is possible.
5 Two eggs in one basket
The possibility that …rms select both the variable and the behavior, cooperative
or non-cooperative, at the same time, remains to be investigated. From Singh
and Vives’ analysis, it emerges that under non-cooperative behavior the quantity-
setting behavior dominates the price-setting behavior, while from the preceding
section one obtains that the non-cooperative choice of the variable in which …rms
can collude leads to a price-setting behavior. As a consequence, I can construct
a single-stage reduced form game where …rms, in choosing the variable to be set,
also choose which kind of behavior they want to assume. This is done in matrix 2,
where the choice of price implies a collusive attitude, while the choice of quantity
implies a non-cooperative attitude.
j
p(c) q(nc)
i p(c) ¼M ; ¼M ¼pChi ; ¼
qD
j
q(nc) ¼qDi ; ¼
pCh
j ¼
C; ¼C
Matrix 2
Provided the price game is completely symmetric, ¼M = ¦M=2: The Cournot-
Nash equilibrium pro…t is ¼C = 1=(2 + °)2; while the pro…ts appearing in the
asymmetric cases where one …rm sets the optimal cartel price and the other
deviates along her Cournot reaction function are de…ned in (9) and (10) above.
The payo¤s can be ordered as follows: ¼qD > ¼M > ¼C > ¼pCh: Hence, I can
claim:
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Proposition 3 In the game where …rms non-cooperatively and simultaneously
choose both the market variable and mode of competitive behavior, the prisoners’
dilemma which arises leads them to set quantities and play non-cooperatively.
The outcome is thus described by a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, (q(nc), q(nc)).
Again, …rms can only improve on the non-cooperative result if they are su¢ciently
patient. The calculations needed to compute the critical threshold of the discount
factor are straightforward. Proposition 3 shows that Singh and Vives’ conclusion
is robust to the introduction of the possibility that …rms choose both strategic
variables and modes of play.
6 Conclusions
If …rms are able to establish which strategic variable is preferable in the market
stage, why shouldn’t they be able to do it in trying to sustain collusion? The
answer to this question has shown that the remedy to the Pareto-ine¢ciency
a¤ecting the one-shot game, namely, the repetition in…nitely many times of the
constituent game, reproduces the same dilemma when the strategic variable must
be decided upon in order to obtain a stable cartel. A prisoners’ dilemma also
arises when …rms are required to choose simultaneously whether to set prices or
quantities and whether to behave cooperatively or non-cooperatively.
The foregoing analysis has also shown that …rms exhibit opposite preferences
to the market variable to be set, depending on whether they aim at maximizing
single-period pro…ts (choosing to be quantity-setters in the one-shot market game)
or cartel stability (choosing to be price-setters in the one-shot upstream stage).
The outcome of the last game examined above leads one to conclude that the
former attitude prevails upon the latter, if …rms proceed to choose in a non-
cooperative way.
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